Selfish-biased
conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated
public goods experiments (and Malte Loos, Javier Perote and
Ulrich Schmidt) Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Psychology.
Bidding
‘as if’ risk neutral in experimental first price auctions
without information feedback (and Javier Perote). (incl. supplement)
Forthcoming in Experimental Economics.
Individual Choice from a
Convex Lottery Set: Experimental Evidence. Forthcoming in :
M. Abdellaboui and J.D. Hey (eds): Advances in Decision Making under
Risk and Uncertainty, Selected Papers from the FUR 2006 conference.
Berlin: Springer 2007.
Preference
Elicitation in Chicken: An Experimental Study, (and Anders Poulsen
and Arthur Schram). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
66, 243-250, 2008.
How
Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment (and
Enrique Fatás and Pilar Tamborero). Journal of Economics
92(2), 167-196, October 2007.
Bioeconomics
of Sustainable Harvest of Competing Species: A Comment incl.
supplement (and Begona Casino) Marine Resource Economics 22: 109-113,
2007.
An Experimental Investigation
of the Role of Errors for Explaining Violations of Expected Utility
(and Ulrich Schmidt). Economic Journal 117: 470-485, March 2007.
Bidding At Sequential
First Price Auctions With(Out) Supply Uncertainty: An Experimental
Analysis (and Paul Pezanis-Christou). (incl. supplement) Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 63 (1): 55-72, May 2007.
Individual Behaviour
of First-Price Auctions: The Importance of Feedback Information
in Experimental Markets (and Reinhard Selten). Games & Economic
Behavior 54: 183-204, 2006.
Within-Team Competition
in The Minimum Effort Coordination Game (and Enrique Fatás
and Javier Perote). Pacific Economic Review 11: 247-266, 2006.
Reciprocity, Matching
and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games (and Rachel
Croson and Enrique Fatás) Economics Letters 87(1): 95-102,
2005.
Bidding
Strategies of Sequential First Price Auctions Programmed by Experienced
Bidders Cuadernos de Economia 75(3): 153-184, 2004.
An Application of The
English Clock Market Mechanism to Public Goods Experiments (and
Maria Vittoria Levati) Experimental Economics 7(2):1-17, 2004 .
Asset Markets
and Equilibrium Selection in Public Goods Games with Provision Points:
An Experimental Study (and Bruno Broseta und Enrique Fatás)
Economic Inquiry 41(4): 574-91, 2003 . |
